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Logic: The Laws of Truth is a thorough introduction to first-order classical logic with identity and 
is an excellent textbook for an undergraduate course on this topic. The real strength of this work is 
the skillful balance struck throughout between a focus on the mechanics and methodology of first-
order logic and a focus on establishing a deep understanding of the purpose of this methodology; 
or, as Smith puts it in the opening sentence of the book, ‘the how and the why of logic’. In striking 
this balance, the book not only provides an introduction to logic suitable for students interested in 
computer science or the foundations of mathematics (and similarly-minded philosophers), but also 
provides an introduction to the philosophy of logic or, at the very least, a guide to where in the 
philosophical terrain a study of logic might and can lead, particularly the basic connections between 
logic and natural language (Ch. 6), and theories of truth (Ch. 11). 
 
The book introduces first-order logic using the truth tree methodology and is set out in three 
parts. The first part treats basic propositional logic, culminating in an introduction to the tree 
method; the second part treats predicate logic; and the third part addresses foundational issues, like 
the soundness and completeness of the tree method, and other methods of proof, like natural 
deduction. The book is on the lengthy side compared to other similar introductory texts on logic, 
but its modularity alleviates any worry one might have about fitting it into a 12 week undergraduate 
course; the obvious candidate – though not necessarily the only candidate – for material to eschew 
would be Part III. This is indicative of the work having pedagogical utility beyond a basic 
introduction to logic. (However, this is not to suggest that it has diminished utility as such an 
introductory text; on the contrary, the clarity and pace of the work are significantly suited to the 
first-year classroom as well as to the incipient autodidact.) 
 
The development in Parts I and II of propositional logic (PL) and both monadic and general 
predicate logic (MPL and GPL, respectively), as well as general predicate logic with identity 
(GPLI), follows a systematic pattern: syntax, semantics, testing. Smith initially moves reasonably 
slowly through the development of PL, introducing the basic symbols before representing the truth-
functionality of the connectives in the form of truth tables. As Smith emphasizes, truth tables play 
a dual role in PL: they provide a precise definition of the central logical notions, such as validity, 
and they provide a method for testing logical formulas for such properties. By teasing apart the 
dual role that truth tables play in semantics and testing in this manner, the way is paved to conclude 
Part I with the introduction of truth trees – a method of testing, but not an endower of semantics – 
and introducing models in Part II to define the central logical notions. 
 
Part II traverses the syntax-semantics-testing pattern with greater urgency: MPL commands 
a chapter for each of the three elements (Ch. 8-10), while both GPL and GPLI are dealt with in a 
single chapter each (Ch. 12 and 13, respectively). By this stage, the pattern is well entrenched, with 
the focus shifting squarely to the greater generality of the enhanced languages. The systematicity 
of the treatment greatly facilitates ease of understanding and ensures that the interesting 
philosophical extensions do not get lost in the logical mechanics. 
 
From the outset, Smith outlines his task in such a way as to provide a guiding principle with 
which to underpin and unify the work. This task is to provide a ‘foolproof’ and general method of  
determining whether some given argument is valid; that is, ‘a method that establishes beyond doubt  
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whether the given argument is valid and that can be followed in a straightforward, routine way, 
without recourse to intuition or imagination’ (19). Smith characterizes validity as necessary truth 
preservation by virtue of form and the ‘foolproof’ methodology he presents is the truth tree method. 
 
By framing the goal of the work in this way, Smith portends an explicit underscoring of  
logical form (Ch. 5). While it is certainly possible to imagine a course on first-order logic foregoing 
an explicit treatment of the relationship between form and content (and dealing with only instances 
as exemplars of the relevant forms), by walking the reader through the mechanics of the reciprocal 
processes of (i) abstracting from content and (ii) obtaining instances, Smith promotes a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the logical language. That is, the reader is encouraged to think about 
the ‘why’ of logic, not just the ‘how’. 
 
There is a second notable, and indeed laudable, feature of the ‘slow and steady’ approach to 
the understanding of logic in the first half-dozen chapters. Chapter 6 explicitly concerns a common 
hurdle that students in the early stages of learning logic face: namely, the imprecise nature of the 
logical structure of natural language and its translation to the precise specification of the logical 
connectives of first-order logic. The concern goes something like this. First-order logic specifies 
that such-and-such natural language expression has so-and-so logical translation. However, by 
such-and-such natural language expression, I can mean a range of different things that do not 
necessarily accord with so-and-so logical translation. Thus, the argument would go, first-order 
logic is dysfunctional as a representative logical language. 
 
Smith tackles this issue head on by recourse to a Gricean analysis of assertibility. While there 
may be many technically synonymous terms that could be interchanged in any particular 
proposition, not all of these will result in a statement that is assertible given a particular context of 
utterance. Following Grice, Smith outlines three categories of information conveyed by an 
utterance in context. The first category – what is said – defines the content relevant for logic; ‘[the 
logical formula] we write down as the translation of an English utterance is supposed to be a 
perspicuous representation of the proposition expressed by that utterance’ (100). The second 
category is what is implied, which consists of information concerning the logical consequences of 
the proposition expressed. And the third category is what is implicated. The implicatures of an 
utterance ‘are those things that follow from the assumption that the utterance is correct’ (100) 
(according to the Gricean analysis of assertibility). 
 
This Gricean analysis becomes a powerful tool for Smith. The ability to bracket particular 
translational issues as pragmatic concerns rather than logical concerns works twofold: it 
demonstrates to the reader that the relationship between logic and natural language is not black and 
white (and this helps to suggest to the interested student that there is further philosophy to be 
explored); and it ensures that confidence in the adequacy of first-order logic is not undermined by 
doubt concerning the superficially imprecise nature of translation. Thus, for the case of some 
purported errant translation of some natural language expression, Smith is able to employ the 
services of Grice's notion of implicature to point out that the translation of what is said comes apart 
from what is implicated, and it is the former that we wish to capture in the logical language, and 
the latter that contributes to the seeming error in translation. 
 
These more pragmatic considerations naturally lead Smith in the final section of Chapter 6 
to consider the notion of functional completeness for a logical language. The idea here is that there  
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is a certain arbitrariness associated with the particular set of connectives we decide to utilize as the  
basis for logic. When we choose a basis set of logical connectives that is functionally complete, 
then we have – by definition – a set that has sufficient resources to construct all possible truth 
functions. Considering that we have limited ability to tweak such sets of connectives according to 
the subtleties of natural language (as there is only a finite number of possible functionally complete 
sets of, say, one- and two-place connectives), we should not expect to find a set with an exact 
correspondence to the structure of our language. This is a skillful and convincing move for 
alleviating any worries the student of logic may have concerning the nature of translation. 
 
As a final point, the importance of logic exercises cannot be overstated. This book contains 
a plethora of exercises on each of the topics covered that would more than placate even the most  
ravenous appetite for logic problems. Furthermore, and especially important as universities move 
perpetually towards web-based learning tools, solutions to these problems can be accessed online 
(the website is provided in the book). While it may be argued that there could be more worked 
examples incorporated into the text – the relative economy of which may slightly increase the effort 
required from the self-learner – there are certainly sufficient resources (or perhaps with the 
additional accompaniment of a competent teacher) to facilitate the reader to become master of the 
mechanics of first-order logic, with a deeper understanding of the associated philosophical terrain.  
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